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Mr. Sergeant's professional success was of course accompanied
by its usual reward, and his heart and his purse were open to every
call of philanthropy and charity, and his gifts must have been to
an extent at the time, and even yet, unknown to us. He in fact
met every appeal promptly, cheerfully and generously.
Mr. Sergeant's moral worth and rectitude were of an exalted
character. He was a man of truth in the highest sense of the
term. But he was more,-he was an humble, pious Christian, and
his religious faith lie appl'ed to his every-day duties; to use his own
language, when referring to such matters :-"In such matters,
however, as I have often remarked to you, our judgment is feeble
and imperfect. We can see but a little way, and that indistinctly.
A conscientious effort to do our duty, with a disposition at all
times submissive to him, who rules the universe, and a continual
sense of his presence, afford the best security for good conduct and
the tranquility it inspires."
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Circuit Court of the United States for the Third Circuit. October Sessions, 1839.
SAMUEL MILLER, JUNIOR, vs. ARCHIBALD M'ELROY.

1

1. Whether an author who gives his work to the public, by printing and publishing
it in a newspaper, not protected by any copy-right, can have such a right in the
same work by afterwards publishing it in a different form, as in a volume or
book.-Qu.
2. Whether the deposite of a title page in the clerk's office, when the work it was
intended for was not then printed, nor written, nor the manuscript prepared for
printing and publication, although the notes or materials from which the work or
1

The editors of the Law Reg. are indebted to Win. H. Crabbe, Esq., of the
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book was to be, and afterwards was composed, were then in the hands of the author,
will entitle him to the copy-right of the work so afterwards prepared and composed.-Qu.
3. If the right exists under the circumstances stated in the first and second queries,
then, whether one can be charged with an infringment of this right if he has, in
fact, never seen or copied from the book so entered and secured, or in any manner used it in his publication, but has reprinted the whole from a public newspaper, unprotected by copy-right, in which he found it, and where the author himself
had published it.-Qu.
4. Whether the fact of it being stated in some of the newspapers publishing as aforesaid, that the author had secured a copy-rrght, can in any way help him.-Qu.
5. Where there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a copy-right, an injunction will not be granted to stay its infringment.

This was a motion for an injunction in a copy-right case.
The complainant's bill alleged that a certain action of quo warranto was tried in March and April, 1889, in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia, that complainant took notes of
the proceedings therein, and subsequently prepared a full and authentic report of the case, containing the speeches of counsel, the
testimony, the charge to the jury, &c., together with original
explanatory notes and remarks; that he afterwards published this
report, in one volume, under the title "Report of the Presbyterian
Church Case: the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at the suggestion of James Todd and others, vs. Ashbel Green and others ;"

the said work was prepared chiefly from his own notes, though
partly from other materials, and that he was the author and proprietor thereof, within the intention and meaning of the Act of
Congress, that he caused a printed copy of the title,. the words,
"Report of the Presbyterian Church Case: The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, ex relatione James Todd and others, vs. Ashbel
Green and others, by a member of the Philadelphia Bar," to be
duly deposited in conformity with said act, and had complied with
all the other requisites thereof; that respondent had, since the publication of complainant's work, caused to be published and sold in
Philadelphia a work under the title of "The Case of the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
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America, before the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, impartially reported by disinterested stenographers;
including all the proceedings, testimony and arguments at nisiprius,
and before the court in bane, with the charge of Judge Rogers, the
verdict of the jury, and the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson," and
that certain large parts of said work, then referred to, were nearly
like the corresponding parts of complainant's work-so nearly like
that respondent must have copied them, more or less literally, from
the latter ; that a great portion of respondent's work was printed
before complainant had published his, but that the parts mentioned
were copied from complainant's work, before the whole of it had
been printed and published, to wit, either from a paper book prepared for the use of the counsel in the case by complainant,
and printed after .he had secured his copy-right, but never published, or from a certain weekly newspaper-" The Presbyterian"
-published in Philadelphia, in which, by the mere verbal permission
of complainant, certain parts of his work were published, after he
had secured his copy-right, but not without public notice of said
copy-right in said newspaper, or else from some other copy of the
work unknown to complainant; and the bill prayed for an injunction, delivery and account, waiving the benefit of the penalty inflicted by the Act of Congress.
The respondent answered that he had published and sold a work
entitled as in the bill alleged, but that it was not true that any
part of said work was copied from the alleged work of complainant ;
that the parts mentioned in the bill were not so copied, but were
wholly and entirely furnished to respondent by Isaac E. Lamborn,
a stenographer, who had no connexion with complainant, and was
not employed or paid by him; that complainant did not duly deposite a copy of the title page of his alleged work, but that the paper
deposited was a copy of a title page differing from that of said
work, and that no copy of the work of which the title page was
deposited was ever so deposited; and that complainant's work was
not made use of in the preparation of the respondent's.
A general replication was filed, and the complainant moved for
an injunction, &c., in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The
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motion was argued on the 17th September, 1839, before Judge
HOPKINsoN, by
Miller, for Complainant, and
.Perkins,for Respondent.
Miller, for the motion.-Does the bill show a good ground for
an injunction ? Such a report is undoubtedly a proper subject for
copy-right. Blackstone says that sentiment and language are the
subject of copy-right. The material of this work probably could not
be claimed exclusively by complainant, but when he has applied thereto his learning, talents, skill and industry, no one has a right to
use the product. Wyatt vs. Barnard,3 Ves. & B. 78; Eden, 329,
823. Burfield vs. Nicholson, 2 Sim. & St. 1. The bill shows that
complainant secured his right, and that the respondent has violated
it. These essential facts shown, we are entitled to the injunction.
Perkins, againstthe motion.-The party asking the interposition
of this high power must show that he has complied with all the
provisions of the law. -Ewer vs. Coxe, 4 W. C. C. R. 487; Godson on patents, 366 ; Act of 3d February, 1931, §4 (4 Story's Laws,
22, 21). The title page of the book published has never been deposited up to this time. The bill itself shows that the title deposited
was "Report of the Presbyterian Church Case: The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ex relatione James Todd and others, vs.
Ashbel Green and others. By a member of the Philadelphia Bar,"
while the title of the book published was simply "Report of the Presbyterian Church Case: the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at the
suggestion of James Todd and others, vs. Ashbel Green and others."
Again, the bill is argumelitative, asserting the words to be so
nearly alike that they must have been copied, and not positively
asserting that one was copied from the other. It is natural and
reasonable that, being reports of the same transactions, they should
be nearly alike; they ought to be so. It is an analogous case to
that of interest tables, which every one must calculate for himself,
but which must all agree. As to the paper books, they were not
used in the preparation of respondent's report; but if they were,
they could not be subjects of copy-right, being part of the records
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of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. lodsley vs. Kinnerley,
Ambl. 403 ; 'Wheaton vs. Peters, 8 Pet. 654. Where, by the conduct of the party, as by allowing others to publish his work, the
state of things he complains of has been created, the injunction will
not issue. Saunders vs. Smith, Am. Jurist, vol. 21, No. 41, pp.
221, 227. This complainant published, or allowed others to publish
his work in the Presbyterian.
On the 23d September, 1839, Judge

IoPKnmsom

delivered the

following opinion in the case:
An action was tried a few months since in the courts of Pennsylvania, in which that Commonwealth, at the suggestion of James,
Todd and others, 7as plaintiff, and Ashbel Green and others defendants. From the nature of the controversy, the importance of
the judgment that might be rendered, and the number and respectability of the persons interested in it, the trial produced in extra-ordinary excitement. The parties were respectively desirous to
have a report of the trial for publication; and persons were accordingly employed, by each of them, to make a report of the proceedings before the court. These reports were published a short time
since, each in an octavo volume, within two or three days of each
other. If both are true and faithful, they cannot substantially
differ from each other, as they both profess to give an account of
the same proceedings. The report made on the part of the defendants, was prepared by this complainant; the other was made,
or published, by Archibald McElroy. The bill, among other things,
prays that an injunction may issue from this court against the respondent, to restrain him from printing, publishing, selling, or
otherwise disposing of the parts of his said book, which complainant charges to be for the most part very nearly in-the same words,
or of the same purport and effect as certain parts of the work or
report printed and published by the complainant, who alleges it
to be absolutely impossible that the said parts of the work so
published by the respondent should be so nearly in the same words,
or of the same purport and effect, as the said parts of the pomplainant's work, if the former had been prepared from original
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notes taken! by the, said respondent, and had not been copied more
or less literally from the complainant. The affidavit which accompanies the bill repeats. and reaffirms these allegations.
On the .23d day of last March'the complainant entered in the
clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, the title of
his.book, as follows : "Report of the Presbyterian Church Case:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ex reZatione James Todd and
others, vs. Ashbel Green and others. By a member of the Philadelphia Bar." It is agreed that the verdict of the jury was rendered. on the 26th March. At the time when this title-page was
deposited with the clerk, the book was not printed, nor was the
manuscript arranged or prepared for printing and publication,
although the materials were in the hands of the author and reporter,
the complainant. The publication was not made for several months
after, as has been already stated.
In addition to these facts it appeared, further, that some months
before the publication of the complainant's book, he had printed
several copies of certain parts of it as a paper book, for the use of
the counsel who argued the motion for a new trial, and of the
judges before whom that motion was argued, but that these copies
were printed after- the. complainant had deposited the title of his
book in the clerk's office; that these paper books were never published or exposed to sale by the complainant, or by any one on his
account, or by his permission or order, but that such publication and
sale were by him strictly prohibited. It is also stated or agreed that
the whole of the contents of the volume or book of the complainant,
with those parts of it now charged to have been taken from him by
the respondent, were printed and published in a certain weekly paper,
published in the City of Philadelphia, by William S. Martien, entitled "The Presbyterian," in eleven successive numbers, by the
verbal permission of the complainant; which publication was also
made after the title of the book had been deposited in the clerk's
office, but a considerable time before the printing and publishing of
the book. It is alleged that the parts of the work of the respondent
complained of were taken, from these paper books or newspapers;
but no allegation is made that any parts of the said book or report of
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the respondent were taken or copied from the book of the complainant, the title-page of which he had deposited -in the clerk's
office; nor that the said book was in any manner used by the respondent in making his report. Indeed, it could not be so, as the
two books were published almost simultaneously. The complainant avers distinctly, that the parts of the respondent's report which
are claimed to be the work and property of the complainant, were
taken from certain paper books he had printed for the purposes
mentioned, and from -certain public newspapers in which his report
had been published with his consent.
Putting, for the present, the paper books, printed for a special
purpose, and, in some degree, confidentially, out of the case, the
publication, by the complainant, of his work in a newspaper, for
which there was no copy-right, circulated, probably, in every State
of the Union, and the property of every one who paid for it, presents some very important and novel questions. I presume they
are so, as neither the industry of the counsel concerned in this
argument nor my own research, has found any judicial answer to
them. They are:
' Whether an author who gives his work to the public, by printing
and publishing it in a public newspaper, not protected by any copyright, can have such a right in the same work by afterwards publishing it in a different form, as in a volume or book?
Whether an author, by depositing a title-page in the clerk's office,
when the work it is intended for is not then printed, nor written,
nor the manuscript prepared for printing and publication, although
the notes or materials from which the work or book is to be, and,
afterwards, actually is, composed, are then in the hands of the
author, may have a copy-right of the work so afterwards prepared
and composed, by affixing it to the title-page so deposited?
Supposing the two previous questions to be answered affirmatively,
that the book so secured by depositing the title-page as aforesaid is
protected from violation, and that no man can reprint and publish
it, or any part of it, without the permission of the author, yet the
question remains whether one can be charged with an infringement
upon this right, if he has, in fact, never seen or copied from the
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book so entered and secured, or in any manner used it in his publication, but has reprinted the same matter, in part or whole, from a
public newspaper, in which he found it, where the author had himself
published it, and in iwhich paper neither the author nor any other
had any copy-right? and
Whether the notice, given in some of the papers of the copy-right,
as stated by the affidavit, can help the complainant?
These are grave questions not to be decided on a preliminary
inquiry and argument, but-to be'left, without prejudice, to the full
and final hearing of the casi. If, on that hearing, the complainant
shall sustain his case and complaint,, he will recover a judgment to
compensate him for the wrong he has suffered, and I have no reason
to believe the respondent will not be able to answer it. In the case
of Ogle v. Ege, 4 Wash. 0. 0. R. 584, Judge WASHINGTON said
on a prayer for an injunction, that if there appears' a reasonable
doubt as to the plaintiff's right, or the validity of his patent, the
court will require him to try his title at law.
Other questions were raised on this argument, such as that the
title of the book is not the same as that deposited in the office, and
that the affidavit is not direct but argumentative. These it is unnecessary for me to notice at this time. It is my desire and intention
to keep myself as free and open upon all the points that may hereafter be presented to my judgment in this case. Were I to grant
the injunction I should decide the questions I have stated, as Nwell as
others, affirmatively for the complainant. This I am not now prepared to do, whatever may be my opinion hereafter. The parties
will come to the final earing on their respective rights without a
prejuication of any one of them.
The injunction is refused.
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In Supreme Court of the United States, December, 1852.
Rrror to the the Supreme Court of Ilinois.

Writ of

MOORE, EXECUTOR OF EELLS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
1, A State may by virtue of its general police power, repel from its borders an unacceptable population, whether paupers, criminals, fugitives, or liberated slaves
and may hence punish her own citizens who thwart this policy of expulsion by assisting such fugitives.

2. The Illinois act is not the same as the Act of Congress of February 12, 1793section 4.
3. A man may by the same act commit two offences against two different sovereignties, and may hence be punished by both, but this is not a double punishment
for the same offence.
4. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 5-40, commented on and points restated.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted
under the criminal code of Illinois, for " harboring and secreting a
negro slave." The record was removed by writ of error, to the
Supreme Court of that State; and it was there contended on behalf
of the plaintiff in error, that the judgment and conviction should be
reversed, because the statute of Illinois, upon which *theindictment
was founded, is void, by reason of its being in conflict with that
article of the constitution of the United States, which declares "that
no person held to labor or service in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor may be
due," and also because said statute is in conflict with the Act of
Congress on the same subject.
That this record presents a case of which this court has jurisdiction under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, is not disputed.
The statute of Illinois, whose validity is called in question, is
contained in the 149th section of the criminal code, and is as
follows: 1 if any person shall harbor or secrete any negro, mulatto,
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or person of color, theosame being a slave or servant owing service
or labor to any other- persons, whether they reside in this State or
in any other State or territory or district, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or shall in any wise hinder
or prevent the lawful owner or owners of such slaves or servants, from retaking them in a lawful manner, every such person
so offending, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined
not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding six
months."
The bill of indictment framed under this statute, contains four
counts:
The 1st charges that "Richard Eells, a certain negro slave owing
service to one C. D., of the State of Missouri, did unlawfully secrete,
contrary to the form of the statute," &c.
2d. That he "harbored" the same.
3d. For unlawfully secreting a negro owing labor in the State of
Missouri to one C. D., which said negro had secretly fled from said
State and from said C. D.
4th. For unlawfully preventing C. D., the lawful owner of said
slave, from retaking him in a lawful manner, by secreting the said
negro, contrary to the form of the statute, &c.
In view of this section of the criminal code of fllinois, and this
indictment founded on it, we are unable to discover anything which
conflicts with the provisions of the constitution of the United States,
or the legislation of Congress on the subject of fugitives from
labor. It does not interfere in any manner, with the owner or
claimant, in the exercise of his right to arrest and recapture his
slave. It neither interrupts, delays or impedes the right of the
master to immediate possession. It gives no immunity or protection to the fugitive against the claim of his master. It acts neither
on the master nor his slave; on his right or his remedy. It prescribes a rule of conduct for the citizens of Illinois. it is but the
exercise of the power which every State is admitted to possess, of
defining offences and punishing offenders against its laws. The
power to make municipal regulations for the restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the health and morals of her
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citizens, and of the public peace, has never been surrendered by the
States, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States.
Irthe exercise of this power, which has been denominated the
police power, a State has a right to make it a penal offence to introduce paupers, criminals, or fugitive slaves within its borders and
punish those who thwart this policy by harboring, concealing, or
secreting such persons. Some of the States coterminous with those
who tolerate slavery, have found it necessary to protect themselves against the influx either of liberated or fugitive slaves, and
to repel from their soil a population likely to become burdensome
and injurious, either as paupers or criminals. Experience has
shown also that the results of such conduct as that prohibited by
the statute in question are not only to demoralize their citizens who
live in daily and open disregard of the duties imposed upon them
by the constitution and laws, but to destroy the harmony and kind
feelings which should exist between citizens of this Union, to create
border feuds and bitter animosities, and to cause breaches of the
peace, violent assaults, riots and murder. No one can deny or
doubt the right of a State to defend itself against evils of such
magnitude, and punish those who perversely persist in conduct
which promotes them.
As this statute does not impede the master in the exercise of his
rights, so neither does it interfere to aid or assist him. If a State,
in the exercise of its legitimate powers in pronuotion of its policy of
excluding an unacceptable population, should thus indirectly benefit
the master of a fugitive no one has a right to complain that it has
thus far, at least, fulfilled a duty assumed or imposed by its compact as a member of the Union.
. But though we are of opinion that such is the character, policy
and intention of the statute in question, and that for this reason
alone the power of the State to make and enforce such a law cannot be doubted; yet we would not wish it to be inferred by any implication from what we have said, that any legislation of a State to
aid and assist the claimant, which does not directly or indirectly delay, impede or frustrate the reclamation of a fugitive, or
interfere with the claimant in the prosecution of his other remedies,
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is necessarily void. This question has not been before the court,
sand cannot be decided in anticipation of future cases.
It has been urged that this act is void, as it subjects the delinquent to a double punishment fo a single offence. But we think
that neither the fact assumed in this proposition, nor the inference
from it, will be found to be correct. The offences for which the
fourth section of the act of 12th February, 1793, subjects the delinquent to a fine of five hundred dollars, are different in many
respects from those defined by the statute of Illinois. The Act of
Congress contemplates recapture and reclamation, and punishes
those who interfere with the master -in the exercise of this right:
1st, by obstructing or hindering the claimant in his endeavors to
seize and arrest the fugitive. 2dly, by rescuing the fugitive when
arrested; and, 3dly, by harboring or concealing him after notice.
But the act of Illinois having for its object the prevention of the
immigration of such persons, punishes the harboring or secreting
negro slaves, whether domestic or foreign, and without regard to
the masters' desire either to reclaim or abandon them. The fine
imposed is not given to the master as the party injured, but to the
State, as a penalty for disobedience to its laws. And if the fine
inflicted by the Act of Congress had been made recoverable by
indictiment, the offence, as stated in any one of the counts of the bill
before us, would not have supported such an indictment. Even the
last count, which charges the plaintiff in error with unlawfully preventing C. D., the lawful owner, from retaking the negro slave, as
it does not allege notice, does not describe an offence punishable by
the Act of Congress.
But, admitting that the: plaintiff in error may be liable to an
action under the Act of Congress for the same acts of harboring and
preventing the owner from retaking his slave, it does not follow
that he would be twice punished for the same offence. An offence,
in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law. A man
may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the injured
party, and be liable also to punishment for a breach of the public
peace, in consequence of the same act, and may be said, in common
parlance, to be twice punished for the same offence. Every citizen
-
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of the United States, is also a citizen of a State or Territory. He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable
to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same
act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both. Thus,
an assault upon the Marshal of the United States, and hindering
him in the execution of legal process, is a high offence against the
United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment;
and the same act may be also a gross breach of the peace of the
State, a riot, assault or murder, and subject the same person to a
punishment under the state laws for a misdemeanor or felony.
That either or both may, (if they see fit,) punish such an offender,
cannot be doubted; yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender
has been twice punished for the same offence, but only that by one
act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly
punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one, in bar to
a conviction by the other. Consequently, this Court has decided,
in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio, 5 Howard, 432,) that a
State may punish the offence of uttering or passing false coin as a
cheat or fraud practised on its citizens; and in the case of The
United States v. Mfarigold, 9 How. 560, that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, may punish the same act as an offence
against the United States.
It has been urged, in the argument on behalf of the plaintiff in
error, that an affirmance of the judgment in this case will conflict
with the decision of this Court in the case of .Priggv. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 540. This, we think, is a mistake. The questions presented and decided in that case differed
entirely from those which affect the present. Prigg, with full power
and authority from the owner, had arrested a fugitive slave in Pennsylvania, and taken her to her master in Maiyland. For this he
was indicted and convicted under a statute of Pennsylvania, making
it a felony to take and carry away any negro or mulatto for the
purpose of detaining them as slaves.
The following questions were presented by the case and decided
by the Court.
1st. That under and in virtue of the Constitution of the United
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States, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in
every State in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave wherever
he can do it without illegal violence or a breach of the peace.
2d. That the government is clothed with appropriate authority
and functions to enforce the delivery on claim of the owner, and
has properly exercised it under the Act of Congress of 12th February, 1793.
3d. That any State law or regulation which interrupts, impedes,
limits, embarrasses, delays or postpones the right of the owner to
the immediate possession of the slave and the immediate command
of his service, is void.
We have, in this case, assumed the correctness of these doctrines,
and it will be found, that the grounds on which this case is decided
were fully recognized in that. "1We entertain," say the Court
(page 625,) "no doubt whatsoever that the States, in virtue of their
general police power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and retrain
runaway slaves, and remove them from their borders, and otherwise
to secure themselves against their depredations and evil example,
as they certainly may do in cases of idlers, vagabonds and paupers. The rights of the owners of fugitive slaves are in no just
sense interfered with or regulated by such a course, and in many
cases the operations of the police powers, although designed essentially for other purposes, for the protection, safety and peace of the
State, may essentially promote and aid the interests of the owners.
But such regulations can never be permitted to interfere with, or to
obstruct the just rights of the owner to reclaim his slave, derived
from the Constitution of' the United States, or with the remedies
prescribed by Congress to aid and enforce the same."
Upon these grounds we are of opinion that the act of Illinois,
upon which this indictment is founded, is constitutional, and therefore affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
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Waldo County Session, faine, October, 1852.
CHIEF JUSTICE SHEPLEY'S CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY.
1. The citizen cannot.resist by force the execution of process obtained through the
tribunals in the regular course of proceedings, although he may consider it to
have been unconstitutionally and unjustly obtained; such forcible resistance would
render him criminally liable.
2. The citizen is not at liberty to offer the least resistance, by force, to the execution of a law esteemed by himself to be an unauthorized and unconstitutional one,
nor may he incite others to do so, even when it acts directly upon his own person
or property.
STATEMENT.

The charge of the grand jury was made under the following circumstances:-

Samuel Jewell, by an agreement with the owner, entered upon
a lot of uncultivated land about forty years ago; had cleared and
cultivated part of it, built a small framed house and barn upon it,
and had continued to occupy it until the spring of the year 1851.
He had some years before that agreed with the owner to pay him
500 dollars for the land, and had paid $200 in part. He had for
a long time neglected to pay any more. He had a son John J.
Jewell, who had, with his wife, resided for some years with his father.
The owner of the land had commenced suits against both to recover possession of it, and had recovered judgments against them.
Writs of habere facias had been issued and placed in the hands of
an officer for execution, and they had refused, upon his request, to
quit the premises. Under these circumstances, one John N. Cousins made an agreement with the owner of the land to purchase it,
and he made an attempt, without success, to induce them to leave
it, offering them some compensation. Failing to obtain possession,
Cousins caused an officer, with the writs, to go to the farm with an
armed posse, to remove them from it. The officer informed them
that he had such writs, and that it was his duty to remove them
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from the land forcibly, if they would not depart peaceably. They
refused to leave or to permit him' to enter, and barred the doors
and fastened the windows. The officer directed his assistants to
break in at a door. The attempt was made without success, and a
.gun was seen to be there presented. He then directed his assistants to cut through the side of the house. They did so, and after
an opening had been made, a gun was fired through it, and Cousins
was thereby killed.
The Jewel]s had insisted that they had acquired rights by their
long-continued possession, and that the judgments against them
had been improperly recovered.
CHARGE.

Gentlemen of tie Grand Jury :-You may be called in the discharge of your official duties to investigate the circumstances, under
which a fellow citizen has been killed, while alleged to have been
assisting an officer in the discharge of his official duties. The
occasion therefore is not unsuitable, if it does not require that the
principles should be stated, by which men should be governed,
when required by the laws of the country in which they dwell, to
do an act or to refrain from doing it.
Obedience to established law is the principle upon which alone
our civil and religious freedom can be maintained.
luch h~s recently been spoken and written respecting the duty
of obedience to human laws, and there has been much of vague
statement and of involved and of inconclusive argument, affording
no very definite or clear rules easy of comprehension by a whole
people, and fitted for application to the common concerns of life.
And yet it is believed, that men unlearned in the law and unqualified for legal investigations or for intricate and difficult processes
of reasoning, were not intended to be left without rules for their
government, which could be readily comprehended and applied.
The offence alluded to, is reported to have been committed while
resisting the execution of a judgment rendered by a judicial tribunal.
When a judgment is obtained by one person against another by
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a regular and legal course of judicial proceedings, and the person,
against whom it has been obtained, considers it to have been
illegally or unjustly obtained, he cannot be permitted to offer the
least resistance to the execution of it. If the judgment has been
obtained against him by false testimony, or by any accident, negligence, or oversight on his own part, it is not the less binding and
operative upon him, until he obtains relief from it in the manner
prescribed by law; and while it remains in force, the least resistance to its execution is unauthorized and illegal, and is liable to be
punished in the same manner that it would be if the judgment
had been rendered without the occurrence of any accident, neglect,
or false testimony.
. If this were not the rule of law and of duty, every man would be
at liberty to resist the regular and constituted administration and
execution of the laws; to do that whichi seemed right in his own
eyes; and there would be no security for person or property -without resort to an armed force. Our present form of government
could exist no longer for any beneficial purpose.
A person may believe that an Act of the Legislature is unauthorized by the Constitution of the State or of the United States,
and the inquiry is presented, whether he should obey it. It will
be his first duty to ascertain, if possible, whether there is good
reason to believe that his opinion is a correct one. After obtaining the best information within his power, should he continue to be
of the same opinion, he may assume the responsibility, disregard
the enactment, and abide the consequences. But he must not offer
the least forcible resistance to the execution of the law esteemed to
be unconstitutional, even when it acts directly upon his own person
or property, nor incite or encourage others to do so. He must
quietly permit it to operate upon his person or property in the
same manner as he should do if there were no doubt that it was
a constitutional and valid enactment, and submit to its effect, until
by a regular course of legal proceedings he can obtain the decision
of a judicial tribunal provided for that purpose, and thus, if the act
be decided to be unconstitutional, obtain redress for any injury to
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his person, property or rights, occasioned by the enforcement of
the unconstitutional enactment.
He may not under any circumstances, resort to force himself or
incite others to do so, to prevent the execution of the law by a
regular judgment or otherwisq, by officers appointed for that purpose, although it may finally prove to have been unconstitutional
and void.
To allow him to do so, would be to permit every man to be the
final judge of the constitutionality and validity of the laws, to disturb the public peace by resisting them, and to introduce disorder,
violence, and the shedding of blood, upon the judgment and according to the will and pleasure of every man in the community.
The rule of duty is plain. A man may disregard a law, which
he believes to be a violation of the constitution, and abide the consequences upon his person or property; but he must not offer the
least resistance to the regular execution of such a law, or incite
others to do so, however severely it may act upon his person,
property or rights. He must seek for redress through a regular
course of legal proceedings.
A person may believe that an act of a legislative body legally
passed in accordance . with the provisions of the constitution, by
which it is governed, is contrary to the laws of God. The inquiry
is then presented respecting his duty to obey it.
His first duty is to ascertain whether the act is clearly and
directly opposed to the divine law. When this has been ascertained clearly, as when for example such an act should require him
to hate and to kill his efiemay, while the divine law declares, thou
shalt love thine enemies and shalt not kill, the human law is to be
disobeyed, and the divine law obeyed. The person is not at liberty
to obey the human law. When no commandment or precept in the
revealed will of God can be found, which if written under the human
law, would be clearly opposed to it, it is the duty of the citizen to
obey the human law.
It may be, as it has often been, contended that, although no precept of the divine law clearly opposed to the human law can be
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found, a person may ascertain certain rules and principles resulting from the whole revealed will of God, and may conclude, that
these rules and principles are opposed to a law of the country, and
that he is therefore authorized and required to disobey it.
The-reasoning, on which this position is based, is unsound; and
the position itself is unauthorized by the divine commandments and
precepts.
Few persons could be found, who would agree upon all the rules
and principles resulting from the whole of the revealed will of God.
Such rules and principles would be different when presented by
those who were more or less highly endowed with intellectual
power, and by those whose minds were more or less highly cultivated and trained to profound, elaborate, and intricate courses of
investigation and deduction; and by those who were more or less
under the guidance of a cirrect moral sense and religious influence,
and who were more or less perfectly instructed in the divine precepts. These rules and principles might be as numerous and
various as the degrees of mental power, of mental cultivation, and
of correct moral and religious instruction.
It could not have been the intention of the divine Instructor to
leave men in such a condition, that when called upon to obey the
laws of their country, there should be found no certain rule of conduct prescribed by Him, applicable alike to all persons, and so
clearly made known that all persons of common capacity, who
could read, or comprehend what was read by others, could understand and act upon it. It must have been His intention to communicate a common and plain rule for all classes of persons, or
there would be no common and plain rule of duty.
When, therefore, a person can find no direct and palpable conflict between a divine and human law, he is not at liberty to enter
upon an elaborate course of investigation and inquiry, whether a
rule cannot be deduced by his scriptural studies and mental operations, as resulting from the whole of the divine precepts, which rule
will be in conflict with human laws, and to act upon this rule of his
own making.
Rules and principles thus deduced, are not of God. They are
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the workmanship of man. To pursue such a course is to set up a
rule often elaborated from his own pride of intellect and of cultivation, or from self-will, or ignorance, or fanaticism, in place of the
divine will, and to make it the foundation of a willful opposition to
the regularly established laws of the country.
It is not intended to deny that such rules may be useful, and
may be used to determine the moral duties of man, when those
duties are not plainly prescribed by divine or human laws.
When one is required and obliged to disobey a human law,
because it is opposed to the plain letter and declaration of the
divine law, is he therefore authorized to oppose by force the execution of the human law? Certainly not. It is his duty to disobey
calmly and quietly, without the least attempt to resist, or otherwise
to oppose the execution of the human law by the officers appointed
to execute it. He is simply to disobey it, and to abide the consequences of his disobedience, whatever they may be, without any
attempt by force or violence, or by inciting others to use it, to prevent the full effect of the penalty, imposed by the human law for
its violation, being inflicted upon his person or property.
The duty is plainly inculcated in the Scriptures not to oppose by
force or violence the laws of an existing government irrespective of
their character. It is one's duty to follow the example of Daniel
and refuse to worship Darius, and to follow his example also by
submitting to go into the den of lions without any attempt by force
or violence to prevent the execution of the law upon himself.
This is not a fit occasion to consider under what circumstances a
person may by the divine law be permitted to overtlnow an existing government by revolutibn, and these remarks are not applicable
to such a question. Nor are they intended to question the right
of every citizen to discuss with entire freedom the character of
existing laws, and to show, that they permit or encourage moral
misconduct, and that they are otherwise unwise or inexpedient,
and that they ought to be altered or repealed.
Some persons attempt to justify their disobedience of human
laws by asserting, that they cannot in conscience obey them.
The present occasion is not an appropriate one to consider
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whether conscience may not be the best guide for the determination of man's moral duties, where the revealed will of God respecting them is not and cannot be known.
It may be safely asserted, that conscience is not to be relied
upon as affording a correct'or safe rule of duty for a people, to
whom the will of God has been made known.
The revealed will of God constitutes the rule of right and wrong.
There can be nothing right, which is opposed to it; nothing wrong,
which is in accordance with it.
Man's conscience during all his past history has been frequently
and greatly opposed to it.
Men's consciences differ according as their moral and religious
and mental instruction has been more or less correct and thorough.
The divine will, as plainly revealed and made known in the
Scriptures, has, in the manner already stated, determined man's
duty respecting obedience and disobedience of human laws. It is
the only perfect rule of duty. No man can be assured, that his
own conscience does afford a perfect rule. He, that would substitute for the divine will the conscience of man, or his own conscience, would in effect cast away the Christian religion as a rule of
duty and unite himself with those who may have no better or safer
guide than conscience, often blunted by the indulgence of pride,
passion, self-will, and self-interest, darkened by erroneous and prevailing opinions and instructions, and blinded by superstition and
fanaticism. He, that would do this, knoweth not what manner of
spirit he is of, or he would not attempt to thrust aside the revealed
will of God as a rule of duty and to set up his own conscience in
its place. It is but an exhibition of self-conceit and of revolting
presumption for any man favored with a revelation of the divine
will to present his own conscience as affording a more correct and
infallible rule of duty than the revealed will of God; or to question
the sufficiency of the divine precepts and to attempt to supply their
defects by a voice within him.
It is not intended to deny that the conscience of man was given
to aid him in the discharge of his moral duties; or that it should
be used for that purpose. It should however occupy its proper
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position of a monitor to man, to walk in the right ways of the
Lord, and it should not exalt itself to the position of a revelator of
the divine will. When it attempts to do this, it displaces that
revealed will, and usually becomes the revelator of the self-will and
perversity of man.

In the Supreme Court of New York.
THE ONEIDA BANK VS. BURTON D. HURLBUT.
1. A holder of a bill of exchange payable at a day certain, may present it for acceptance at any time before maturity, and upon refusal of the the drawee to
accept, may give notice of such refusal to the prior parties, and have an action
against them at once.
2. If the holder omit to give notice to the drawer and endorsers, of the refusal of
the drawee to accept upon presentment, they will be discharged, unless the bill
subsequently come to the hands of a bona fide holder for value, who again presents the bill and duly charges the prior parties.
3. To constitute a valid undertaking as an acceptance, the undertaking must in
New York be in writing, and signed by the acceptor. The writing must indicate
that the party sought to be charged as acceptor, intended to take upon himself
the obligations, and assume the liabilities of an acceptor.
4. A bill drawn by a manufacturing corporation in the country, upon an individual
in New York city, who is the treasurer and financial agent of the company,.and
presented for acceptance to the drawee, who writes across the face of the bill,
"accepted, payable at American Exchange Bank," and signs it "Clayville Mills,
by E. C. Hamilton, Treasurer," (Clayville Mills being the drawers,) is not accepted
by the drawee.
5. The acceptance is that of the corporation and the endorsers, are entitled to notice
of non-acceptance by the drawee, and for want of notice, are discharged from
liability to the holder of the bill.

This cause was tried at the Oneida Circuit, without a jury. The
facts sufficiently appear in the following opiiiion:
. A. Mann, for Plaintiff.
Hf. -Denio,for Defendant.
W. F. ALLEN, Justice.-This action is brought against the de-
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fendant as indorser of an inland bill of exchange drawn by the
"Clayville Mill," an incorporated company doing business in
Oneida county, upon "E. C. Hamilton, New York," at fifty days
after date, for five thousand, dollars, and indorsed by F. Hollister,
the payee, by T. P. Ballou, and by the defendant. Before its
maturity, the bill was presented by the holder to the drawee, for
acceptance, who wrote across its face, "accepted, payable at American Exchange Bank," and signed it " C layville Mills, by E. 0.
Hamilton, Treasurer." The holders treated this as an acceptance
by the drawee, and gave no notice of non-acceptance to the other
parties to the bill. Evidence was given that the drawee -was the
Treasurer of the "Clayville Mills," and that the bill was drawn on
account of the company, that he had no funds in hand belonging
to that corporation-that he was not indebted to it-that he was
the general financial agent of the company in New York, and the
evidence justifies the conclusion that he was authorized to bind the
company in any legitimate way, for the payment of the debt represented by the bill. Although the holder of a bill of exchange payable at a day certain, is not bound to. present the same to the
drawee for acceptance, before its maturity, still he may do so, and
upon the refusal of the drawee to accept, cause notice of such
refusal to be given to the drawer and indorsers, and have an action
against them at once. If the holder omits to give notice of the
refusal to accept, the drawer and indorsers will be discharged.
Blesard vs. Hirst, 5 Burr. Rep., 2670; Goodall vs. Dolley, 1 T.
R., 712; Allen vs. Suydam, 20 Wend. R., 324. Bosceoe vs.
Hardy, 12 East., 434; Story on Bills, § § 228 and 284.
To effect such discharge, the bill must be actually presented for
acceptance, and the acceptance refused. It is not sufficient that
the holder informs the drawee that he has the bill, and the drawee
thereupon tells him that the bill will not be accepted or paid. Pall
River Union Bank vs. Willard, 5 Met., 216. Neither will presentment and refusal without notice, discharge the drawer and
indorsers from liability upon the bill in the hands of a subsequent
bona fide indorsee for value, who causes the same to be again presented for acceptance, and proper notice of non-acceptance to be
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given. O'Keefe vs. Dana,6 Taunt. 805; S. C. in error, 5 1I. &S.,
282. In the case before me, the plaintiffs were the holders of the
bill at the time it was presented, and no question is made that it
was actually presented for acceptance before maturity-that it was
xiot accepted in any other manner than above stated, and that no
notice of non-acceptance was given to the defendant. The only
question, therefore, is whether the bill was in truth accepted by the
drawee, for if not, the defendant is discharged. The plaintiffs
treated the undertaking on the face of the bill, as an acceptance by
the drawee, and so aver it to be in their complaint. The question
is not, it appears to me, necessarily whether the Clayville Mills are
bound by the acceptance. It is quite immaterial whether an obligation has been incurred by a third person. If none was incurred by
the drawee, there was no acceptance by him. An acceptance to be
valid, must be in writing, (1 R. S., 768, § 6,) and although it is not
required to be in any particular form, it must be signed by the
acceptor, and it must appear from the written undertaking, that the
drawee intended to take upon himself the obligations and assume
the liabilities of an acceptor, or at least that by the writing, the
holder was induced to believe that the drawee did undertake, as an
acceptor, so as to estop him from denying his acceptance thereafter.
The signature of the acceptor may be either in the usual form, or
may be in characters or cyphers, but it must appear from the
writing, when fully understood, that the person sought to be charged
as an acceptor, designed by the writing to accept the bill according
to its termis. Brown vs. The Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, 6
Hill, 443; Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Den., 471. It is competent in
an action between the original parties to a written instrument, for
one whose initials or full name appears to the obligation to show
that they were placed there to attest the execution of the instrument, or for any other lawful purpose, and not as maker of the instrument. Palmervs. Stephens, -b. If the purpose for which a party
puts his name upon a paper appears by the form of the instrument
or in any other way, upon the face of the writing, there is no
necessity of parol evidence to establish the same fact, and if the
apparent purpose is to attest the execution by a third person or
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some other legitimate purpose, and not as maker, the burthen of
proof will be upon the holder of the writing, (if such proof should
be competent,) to show that the name was put there with intent to
create an obligation as a party.
The question in this case would have been different, had Hamilton
merely written his name across the bill, adding thereto the word
"Treasurer," or "Treasurer of the Clayville Mills." It might
then have been said that the addition was a description of the
person, a mere memorandum not affecting his liability to the
holder of the bill. At least it might well be said to be equivocal,
and therefore to be taken 'most strongly against the party thus
signing his name. Although by such signature to a promissory
note given for the benefit of the corporation, it might be bound as
maker, it is more questionable whether an acceptance in that form
would not be an acceptance of the drawee individually, and not of
the corporation.
But here the act of the drawee is by no means equivocal. He
has declared as plainly as he could do, that he did not intend to
accept the bill individually, and become bound as acceptor. It is
true his name is signed to the acceptance, but simply as the agent
of the Clayville Mills, and to attest the execution by that company,
to show that he, as the amanuensis of the company, wrote the corporate name to "the acceptance. Had the acceptance been under
the corporate seal of the company, and the drawee's name had not
appeared upon the paper, he could not have been charged as
acceptor, although he might have affixed the seal. The act relied
upon as an acceptance, is upon its face the act of the company, and
not of the drawee. There is nothing by which the holder had a
right to infer that the drawee intended to bind himself as acceptor
of the bill. It is not enough that the drawee should write the
word "accepted," across the bill; it must be signed by him. This
is not so signed; it is signed by the Clayville Mills. The acceptanceis no more signed by the drawee, than it would have been had
some third person signed as acceptor, and Hamilton had at the
request of the holder, written his name on the margin or underneath, expressing in words that he did so to attest the signature of
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such third person, and for no other purpose. By writing his own
narie, he has merely certified that he signed the name of the
" Clayville Mills" by the procurement of that company. - It is as
if he had said after signing the name of the corporation to the obligation, "1I certify that I signed the name of the ' Clayville Mills'
to this acceptance, as the Treasurer and agent of that company,
and that I have full authority to do so, and by such act to bind the
company." This is quite different from saying "I accept this bill,"
and signing it individually. The language 'in each case is equally
plain. In the one, it is an acceptance by the drawee, and in the
other, it is not. The bill was not accepted by the drawee, and if
the acceptance is not that of the " Clayville Mills," it was accepted
by no one, and the defendant is discharged for want of notice of
non-acceptance by the drawee.
A question was made upon the liability of the Olayville Mills
upon the acceptance. In the view I take of the case it is quite immaterial whether that company is bound or not. If the drawee did
not accept the bill when it was presented for acceptance, the defendant, as endorser, was entitled to notice of the non-acceptance; and
such notice not having been given, he is discharged. But it is said
that Hamilton, having undertaken to act for and bind the corporation of which he was treasurer; if he has failed to do so, he may be
charged as acceptor in the place of the party for whom he professed
to act. I think this proposition cannot be sustained, but for all the
purposes of this case it may be assumed to be true, without at all
affecting the result.
It is quite material whether Hamilton's liability is as acceptor, or
by reason of his undertaking to accept for another and failing to
bind that other for want of authority or for any other reason. The
undertaking of the defendant was that the drawee should accept
the bill when presented, and not that he would commit no fraud
upon the holder. If he refused to accepti the endorser was entitled to
notice. An ineffectual attempt to bind another person, which should
subject the drawee to a liability, would not be equivalent to an acceptance in form by him. The agent, in acting for his principal,
undertakes, for the truth of his representations as to his authority
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and while in this State he may in some cases be made liable as
upon a contract made by himself, still the fraud and misrepresentation is the gist and foundation of the action. In England and Massachusetts, and some other States, the action against the agent must
be by special action on the case. 3 Barn. & Ald. 114; 11 Mass.
97; 16 ibid. 461; 11 S..& R. 129; 3 Johns. Cas. 70; 13 Johns.
Rep. 307; 7 Wend. 315; ibid. 106; 2 Greeni. R. 358.
The ground of recovery against the professed agent in a case like
this would be that he had not given the holder the valid acceptance
of a third person, which he had undertaken to do. His liability
would not be that of drawee and acceptor, but would be that which,
as agent of the Clayville Mills, he undertook to assume on behalf -of
that corporation; that is, as an acceptor for honor, or a collateral
acceptor. Suppose that when the bill was presented Hamilton, instead of accepting the bill, had delivered to the holder the promissory note of a third person, guaranteeing its payment. He would,
by this absolute guaranty, have become bound for the payment of
the amount specified in the bill, but not as acceptor, or in a way
to excuse notice of non-acceptance of the bill to drawer and endorsers. The note and its guarantee would have been collateral to the
bill. In this case, the defendant never undertook that the Clayville Mills should accept or that Hamilton had authority to act for
them in the premises.
Again, the liability of Hamilton upon this branch of the case is
sought to be established not by want of authority to act as agent
for the Clayville Mills, and to bind them in a legitimate form for
the payment of the sum named in the bill, but for the reason
that the form of the undertaking is such that the company
could not be bound by it under the circumstances; in other words,
that no one can become liable as acceptor, except the drawee,
or one who accepts supra protest for the honor of the drawer
or some other party, and that the Clayville Mills were neither
drawers or acceptors for honor. It is sufficient to say in answer to this, that the circumstances of the case and the form of
the undertaking were known to the holder of the bill, and that he
received the acceptance, such as it was, with full knowledge of all
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the facts which could affect the liability of the nominal acceptor,
and as there was no fraud on the part of Hamilton, so no liability
was recovered by him. An agent is only bound for the truth of
his representation as to his agency. If he has authority to do
what he professes to do, he is absolved from liability. The parties
agreed upon the form of the undertaking of the Clayville Mills,
and if it is ineffectual to bind them, there is no reason why the
loss should fall on Hamilton. The cases cited and relied upon by
the counsel for the plaintiffs are cases of want of authority, in fact,
to act for the principal, or in which the agent had, by the form of
his execution of the power, bound himself, as in White v. Skinner,
13 John. Rep. 315 ; Afeech v. Smith, 7 W. R. 315 ; Dusenbury v.
-Ellis,3 J. Oases, 70 ; 1 Denio, 471, and need not be examined
in detail. So, whether the acceptance by the Clayville Mills was
an acceptance for honor, binding them, is not material. If it was,
then, it not being the acceptance of the drawee, the defendant is discharged, and if it was not, the defendant is nevertheless discharged,
if I am right in my conclusions, that it was not the acceptance of the
drawee.
It would not follow that it was the acceptance of the
drawee because it was not that of the corporation of which he was
the agent. Perhaps the acceptance may be a valid acceptance for
honor, and obligatory upon the acccptors as such, and I am inclined
to think it is so for the following reasons. An acceptance supra
protest may be made for the honor of the drawer or endorser or
drawee of the bill, upon payment by the acceptor for honor,
he has recourse to the party for whose honor it is accepted, and
all prior parties. Story on Bills, § 221 and Seq. A general acceptance supraprotestwill be held to be for the honor of the drawer.
Ch. on Bills, ch. 8, § 3; p. 377, ed. of 1833. It cannot be accepted for honor until after dishonor by the drawee, and, in the
language of the books a protest for non-acceptance is necessary
and should precede the collateral acceptance or payment. 3 Kent's
Com. 87. A protest is strictly applicable to foreign bills only, and
has no proper application to inland bills of exchange. Story on
Bills, § 281, note 3. But a demand of acceptance, or payment of
an inland bill, with notice of dishonor to the proper parties, an15
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swers the purpose of a protest of a foreign bill, and this should
precede an acceptance or payment for honor to the end that the
acceptor for honor may have his recourse even against the parties
liable to him. The holder of the bill undertakes to the acceptor
for honor that he has done everything necessary to charge the
parties to the bill, who should, in case of payment, be liable even to
him. Without examining this question at length, I think this is
the result of the authorities, and this the object of the protest.
Scofield v. Bayard, 3 W. R. 488; Williams v. Germaine,7 Barn.

& Cress. 468; Roan v. Caymon, 16 East, 391, and the case from
Lutw. edited by Lord Ellenburgh; Chitty on Bills, ch. 8, § 3;
Barry v. Olark, 19 Pick. 220. There is no evidence that notice
of non-acceptance was given to the drawer and endorsers upon the
acceptance by the Clayville Mills. On the contrary, it is conceded
that such notice was not given to the endorsers. It is, however,
proved that the drawer had no funds in the hands of the drawee,
so that notice was not necessary to charge the drawer. Com. Bank of
Albany v. ffugzes, 17 W. R. 94; Dolful v. Frosch, 1 Den. 867.
The bill was drawn by the Clayville Mills, who became also the
acceptors.
They knew they had no funds in the hands of the
drawee, and were primarily liable for its payment; and upon payment by them they could have no recourse to the endorsers. They
therefore lost nothing for want of notice of non-acceptance to the
endorsers. Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176. They accepted
for their own honor, and as drawers and acceptors had notice of the
non-acceptance by the drawee, I see not why, upon principle, it is
not a good acceptance. Again, it may be that if the Clayville Mills
are not liable as technical acceptors for honor; they are liable as
upon an absolute undertaking by their acceptance to pay the bill.
They are the drawers, of the bill without funds in the hands of the
drawee, and after its dishonor had presumed absolutely to pay it
according to its terms. They may well be bound by such an acceptance, when a stranger would not be bound. But waiving the
further consideration of all other questions, the defendant is, I
think, entitled to judgment by reason of the refusal of the drawee
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to accept and the omission of the holder to give notice of non-acceptance to the defendant.
Judgment accordingly.
Affirmed on appeal by the court in bane.
ALLEN, HUBBARD

and PRATT,

JJ.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May, 1852.
SCHRIVER ET AL. VS. MEYER.
A testator, by his will, proved in 1829, devised as follows: "Principally andfirst of
all, I commend my soul into the hands of Almighty God who gave it, and my
body to the earth, to be buried in a decent and Christian like manner, at the discretion of my executors hereinafter named, and as to such worldly estate wherewith it has pleased God to bless me in this life, I give and dispose of the same
in the following manner, to wit: Item, it is my will, and I order and direct that
all my just debts and funeral expenses shall be first paid and satisfied. Item, it
is my will, and I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Elizabeth,
eighty-five acres, and allowance of land of my dwelling plantation, whereon I now
live, situate in Springgarden township, in the county aforesaid, she to have the
choice of the same wherever she thinks proper; and further, I do give and
bequeath unto my said wife, all my moveable property or personal estate, of what
kind or nature the same may be, together with all the monies due me, by bond,
note or book account, to and for her only proper use and behoof whatever. Item,
it is further my will, that my brother and sisters divide the residue of' my said
plantation amongst themselves, phare and share alike.
Held, that the introductory words might be brought down to interpret the subsequent devise to the wife, and that they enlarged it into a fee. Weidman vs. Maish,
4 Harris, 504, overruled. GsBsox, J., dis enting. BLAcx, C. J., also dissented.

Error to the Common Pleas of York County.
John Meyer, of York County, Pennsylvania, on the 2d of September, 1827, made his will in the following words:
In the name of God, amen, I John Meyer, of Springgarden
township, in the County of York and State of Pennsylvania, farmer,
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being weak in body but of sound mind, memory and understanding,
blessed be God for the same; but, considering the uncertainty of
this transitory life, do make and publish this my last will and testament, in manner and form following, to wit: Principally and first
of all I commend my soul into the hands of Almighty God, who
gave it, and my body to the earth, to be buried in a decent and
christian like manner, at the discretion of my executors hereinafter
named; and as to such worldly estate wherewith it has pleased
God to bless me in this life, I give and dispose of the same in the
following manner, to wit: Item it is my will, and I order and direct
that all my just debts and funeral expenses shall be first paid and
satisfied; item, it is my will, and I give, devise and bequeath unto
my beloved wife, .lizabeth, eighty-five acres, and allowance of land
of my dwelling plantation, whereon I now live, situate in Springgarden township, in the county aforesaid, she to have the choice of
the same wherever she thinks proper; and further, I do give and
bequeath unto my said wife, all my moveable property or personal
estate, of what kind or nature the same may be, together with all
the monies due me, by bond, note or book account, to and for her
only proper use and behoof whatever. Item, it is further my will,
that my brother and sisters divide the residue of my said plantation amongst themselves, share and share alike; and lastly, I nominate and appoint my beloved friends, Michael Schriver and John
Lefever, of the township aforesaid, to be the executors of this my
last will and testament, hereby revoking all other wills, legacies
and bequests by me heretofore made, and declaring this and no
other for my last will and testament. In witness whereof, I have
hereunto set my hand and seal, this second day of September, one
Signed, sealed, pubthousand eight hundred and twenty-seven.
lished, pronounced and declared by the testator, as and for his last
will and testament, and in presence of us and at his request, have
subscribed our names as witnesses.
N. B.-The words five acres and allowance interlined before
signing.
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This will was duly proved on the 15th of June, 1829.
The question in controversy was, as to whether the devise to the
testator's widow, Elizabeth Meyer, was in fee or for life only.
The same point had been presented in the previous case of TFeidman vs. Taish, reported in 4 Harris, 504, in which the Court below
(Lewis, President,) held that the devise was in fee, and after
repeated arguments in this Court, both orally and on paper, the
judgment of the Court below was finally reversed by a majority of
this Court, C. J. Gibson delivering the opinion at the adjournment
at the last term, and Justices Coulter and Chambers filing their
dissent.
Another suit was brought by the same counsel for another party
claiming an undivided sixth part of the land; and the Court below
said, that without intimating any opinion of their own or examining
the question, they would enter judgment in accordance with the
former case; and they left the question to be settled by this Court.
The plaintiffs in error were therefore the defendants below in this
case.
The opinion of the majority of the Court was delivered by
LowRiE, J.-So far as relates to the intent of the devising
clause, this will was disposed of in a former opinion of this Court
in one sentence, and the remainder of the opinion was devoted to a
clause which is entirely unimportant. The true point of this case
is thus dismissed-" as to the common introductory words, it is
enough to say there is nothing in particular to which they can
attach; and it has long been held that they are inoperative by
themselves." It is with most sincere reluctance, that we find ourselves constrained to declare that this conclusion of our predecessors is opposed to the whole current of Pennsylvania decisions,
and would in almost all similar instances, frustrate the manifest
intent of the testator.
As in the case of Harper v. BBlean, 3 Watts., 471 ; this testator
"had no other real estate than that described in the will. He had
no issue, but left his wife surviving. He left also, brothers and
sisters, under whose right the plaintiff claims." Nearly his whole
fortune was the result of the efforts of himself and wife, and he
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had no intimacy with his brothers and sisters, most of whom lived
at a distance from him. ,Under such circumstances, it would not
have been unreasonable if he had given all he had to his wife, and
certainly common justice would declare her claims to stand much
higher than those of the brothers and sisters.
But we may set aside all this, except the fact that he had no
other land than that described in the will, and construe this will
without the aid of any other extraneous circumstances. It sets out
with the usual introduction, then directs as to his burial, and then
says, "As to such worldly estate wherewith it hath pleased God to
bless me in this life, I give and dispose of the same in the following
manner." Then he directs payment of his debts, and then gives a
particular part of his plantation to his wife, and the rest to his
brother and sisters.
In the case of *Feidmanv. lefaisl, 16 State Rep., 504, this
devise to the wife was held to create a life estate, and we know of
no similar decision in our books, except the case of Steel v. Thompson, 14 S. & R., 88, which is an exceptional case, in opposition to
prior ones, attempting to overrule one of them.
French v.
Melhenny, 2 Binn., 13, decided by a majority of the Court against
a strong dissent, and never since received as law, so far as we know.
The words "as to such worldly estate," &c., if they have nothing
to which they can attach, must of course be inoperative. Here,
however, they are most directly attached to the words "I devise
the same," &c., what follows, then, is most plainly a specification
of the manner in which his "estate" is to be disposed of, and this
brings the case explicitly within that large class 6f cases wherein
the devise of the testator's "estate" is held to carry a fee, and the
whole spirit of these decisions is violated by declaring this a life
estate. In the case of Busby v. Busby, 1 Dal., 226, it was declared
that similar words, "unconnected with any particular devise, show
an intention to dispose of his whole estate," and will help the interpretation in case" of doubt. In Caldwell v. Ferguson, 2 Yeates,
250, 380, there were no words of inheritance, but a fee was raised
by the words "touching such worldly estate, &c., I give the same
in the following manner." And it was there declared that the
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general clause was connected with the rest of the will by the
phrase "I give the same."
In .Dougzty v. Brown, 4 Yeates, 179, the words were "touching
all my worldly effects, real and personal, I dispose thereof in the
following manner." And the Court say that these words "fully
evince his intention of disposing of all his property."
In French v. Helihenny, 2 Binn., 18, "As for such estate, &c.,
I give the same in the following manner," were held sufficient to
carry a fee without anything to aid them. In Cassel v. Cooke, 8
S. & R., 289, a somewhat similar introductory clause is used in aid
of the construction, and the Court say, "It is declared by the
testator that he intends to dispose of all his worldly estate, out and
out. This will not of itself be sufficient to give a fee ; but it is
always carried down to the devising clauses to show the interest."
And the same principle runs through the case of Campbell v. Carson,
12 S. & R., 54, and going a little out of the order of time, the
case of Johnson v. Morton, 10 State Rep., 245. In MeClure v.
.Douthitt, 3 State Rep., 446, the words are "as to my worldly
estate, I dispose of it as follows." And there the testator gives to
his daughter a tract of land. The Court say, "We ought to have
done at first in regard to words of inheritance, what our Legislature
has done at last by declaring every devise to be a fee which is not
specially restricted. The devise to the testator's daughters, therefore, was a fee even as the law then stood." In Iiller v. Lynn,
7 State Rep., 443, the Court in speaking of similar words, say
"the words in the preamble make it apparent that he intended to
dispose of his whole estate. Although, therefore, there are no
words of limitation or perpetuity added to the devise to the children, yet as there is no limitation over, we bring down the word
estate in the preamble, and connect it with the devise in order to
effectuate the intent." In Peppard v. .Deal,9 State Rep., 140,
speaking of a devise of a house and the words "as to my worldly
estate," the Court say "the language in the introduction is carried
down to the devising clause to explain the intent." In Hardin v.
Hfays, 9 State Rep., 151, the Court say "it is very evident from
the introductory clause, that the testator had no intention to die
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intestate, but that in this case as in almost all others, he supposed
he was devising his whole estate. When the word estate is coupled
with a devise of real estate, it is uniformly held to be a fee simple;
and this is carrying out the 'intention of the testator ninety-nine
cases out of one hundred." Here the word estate in the introduction, was coupled with the devising clause exactly as in this case"I give and dispose the same as follows."
In cfCullough v.
ailmore, 11 State Rep., 370, even less definite language, "all my
worldly substance and property shall be disposed of in the following
manner," was held to give a fee. " These words, say the Court,
and the like of them are generally carried down into the corpus of
the will, to show that the testator meant to dispose of his whole
interest in a particular devise, unless words are used which plainly
indicate an intent to limit."
With such unquestionable authority for declaring this devise
conveys a fee simple to the testator's widow, it would be a waste of
time to go over the decisions in England and in other States, and
we content ourselves with a mere reference to some of them. JDenn
v. Gaskin, Cowper 660; Loveacres, v. Blight, Ibid, 335; Trogmorton v. ifolliday, 3 Burrows, 1618; Kennon v. Hefooberts, 1
Wash., 96 ; Wiatt v. Sadler, 1 Mlunf., 587 ; Watson v. Powell, 3
Call., 306 ; Winchester v. Tilghman, 1 Harr. & McH., 452; Jackson v: Merrill, 6 John, 191; Pox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 and
20, 16., 437 ; Fogg v. Olark, 1 N. Hamp., 163 ; _ra~iklin v. Harter,
7 Blackf., 488.
It is among the oldest legal principles that a devise of all one'5
estate carries a fee; and what else is this? If we shorten the devise so as to make the sense more striking, it will stand as follows:
as to all my worldly estate, I devise the same as follows : one farm
to my wife, and the other to my brother and sisters; or thus: I
devise all my worldly estate as follows: my personal property and
half of my plantation, to my wife, and the other half of my plantation to my brother and sisters. In this form, can any one doubt
its true interpretation ?
It is really much more plainly a fee to each than in the cases of
Taylor v. Kocer, 3 W. & S., 163, where the devise was of all his
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"leasehold estate," and Harperv. Blean, 3 Watts, 475, where the
effective words were "with whatever is not named that I have any
right or claim to in law or equity," and Dice v. Sheffer, 3 W. & S.
419, where the words "all what I have, both real and personal property," were declared equivalent to "all my estate." It is stronger
than Neide v. Neide, 4 R. 75, where the devise was "I give to my
son John my late purchase from Elizabeth Clarton, and also four
acres of woodland, being in a corner, &c."
How all this line of decisions was broken through in the case of
Weidman v. Maish, we cannot say, but must presume that it was
inadvertently done, in the crowd of business which presses on this
Court, and which must occasion frequent mistakes. If they were
intended to be overruled, they deserved, in their rejection, a much
more ceremonious eulogy than can be comprised in a single sentence; for great have been the merits, and much good have they
done in the last seventy years.
The testator gives to his wife 85 acres of his plantation, and the
"residue of his plantation" to his brother and sisters, but the plain
and natural meaning of this is, not that he gives his wife a life
estate in one part, and his brother and sisters a fee in the rest,
and also in his wife's part after her death. This phrase, in wills,
has not yet been cast in the moulds of technical expression, and thus
removed from interpretation of common sense. It has still sufficient pliability to fall with ease into its appropriate place, and with
its proper value, in an instrument written in ordinary language.
And so was a similar provision disposed of in the case of A'rcide v.
Neide, 4 R. 82.
But it is demanded of us that we shall follow the decision in
W'eidman v. Maish, where this very devise has received a construction. And why must we follow it? If the law was totally
misapplied in that case, when one forty-fourth part of this land was
in controversy, must we therefore continue to misapply it as often
as the other shares come up for discussion? Because we or our
predecessors have wronged one man by our blunders, must we
therefor wrong forty-three others for the sake of our own consistency ?
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If not thus, then on what principle can we do it? Not simply
because this very devise has been decided on: most clearly not.
This would be presenting the doctrine of former recovery in a new
aspect. One verdict and judgment are not conclusive even in the
very same interest, and between the very same parties; whereas
this would make one verdict and judgment, as to one interest and
one set of parties, conclusive as to all similar interests and as to
other parties, even though not heard.
Does the doctrine of stare decisis hold us to conform to that
decision? I trust that the doctrine shall never be held to mean,
that the last decision of a point is to be taken as the law of all
future cases, right or wrong. Then, indeed, will the isolated blunders of this Court be of far more force than an Act of Assembly or
a clause of the Constitution, for they may invade the inviolability
of contracts. This is certainly a new phase of the doctrine of stare
decisis, that is most suicidal in its results. It is setting aside the
old doctrine, and establishing a new one. It is a declaration that
all courts of the last resort must have been in error every time they
have acknowledged and set aside former errors, which has not been
an unfrequent event. Nay, more; it is claiming for this Court an
infallability that can have no result but the perpetuation of the most
incompatible errors.
As I understand this doctrine, it is tersely expressed in the
maxim minime sunt nutanda quae interpretationemcertain semp)er
habuerunt; and is well qualified by that other one, quae contra
rationemjuris introducta unt, non debent tralii in consequentiam,
both of which are used by Lord Coke, and are derived from the
Roman law. It is well explained in Lieber's Pol. Herm. 209.
"In a free country, where a knowledge of the citizens' rights is all
important, a precedent in law, if correctly and clearly stated-this
is an'essential requisite-and if applied with discernment, and with
the final object of all law before our eyes, ought to have its full
weight. If there has been a series of uniform decisions on the same
point, they ought to have the force of law, because, in this case,
they have become conclusive evidence of the law." And the same
writer has well estimated the value of a mere decision, when he
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says, 1 Pol. Ethics, 265, "there is hardly such a thing as judgemade law, but only judge-spoken law. The doctrine pronounced
to-day from a -bench may, indeed, not be found in any law book;
but the judge has ascertained and declared the sense of the community as already evinced in its usages and habits of business. If he
has not expressed. it correctly, society will show its sovereign power,
his decision will be reversed to-morrow, or corrected by statute."
The true doctrine on this subject was declared and acted upon
by this Court in Geddis v. Hawk, 1 Watts, 286, and Cowden's Appeal, 1 State Rep. 279, and is thus laid down by
Chancellor Kent: (Com. Lect. 21,) "I wish not to be understood to press too strongly the doctrine of stare deeisis, when
I recollect that there are a thousand cases to be pointed out in the
English and American books of reports which have been overruled,
doubted, or limited in their application. It is probable that the
records of many of the courts in this country are replete with hasty
and crude decisions; and such cases ought to be examined without
fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than have the character
of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the system
destroyed by the perpetuity of error. Even a series of decisions is
not always conclusive evidence of what is law, and the revision of a
decision very often resolves itself into a mere question of expediency, depending upon the consideration of the importance of certainty in the rule, and the extent of property to be effected by a
change of it."
Suppose that we now assert that a devise such as this does not
convey a fee simple, what will be the consequence? First we
defeat the intention of this testator, and wrong his devisees. Then
the cases of McClure v. Douthitt, M1iller v. Lynn, rPeppardv. Deal,
Harden v. Hays and McCullough v. Gilmore, were all decided
within a very few years on the opposite principle, and all these
cases will claim the right to be reheard, and all the titles acquired
on the faith of those decisions may be declared invalid. How many
are the wills similarly worded, which have never been heard of in
Court, because their construction has been considered as settled by
former decisions, it is impossible to tell. We dare not say that the
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principle of this case shall be limited to this will; for this would be
making the rights of the parties depend on the will of the judge,
and not on the law of the land. We cannot do justice in this case
without rejecting the decision in JFdidman v. AMai, and reversing this judgment.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendants below, with
costs.
GiBsoN, 3., dissenting.-Itis said, in thd opinion of the majority,' that when this will wis before the judges -Oho composed this
court, in tZeidman v. Htaish, the intioductory wotds were disposed
of in a single sentence ; and that the rest of the opinion -was devoted to a clause entirely unimportant. We; however, follo*ed the
course of the argtment; for, the fact isi the effect of these Wdrds
was not relied on by the counsel in that case, who have ruade it a
successful point in this. They cast it from them; grid though the
counWel on the other side spoke to it in anlticipation, no one,
whether counsel or court, harbored a thought that the d6vise of the
land, unconneted with the bequest of thi personal property, wbatd
give the fee with or without the introductory words. The counsel
who have argued for the larger interpretation have shifted their
ground; but, on that occasion, they rested their case on the supposed blending of the real and personal estates in one gift; and
whether they were so blended was the question argued and the
question decided. They have since picked up their derelict argument, and succeeded with it. The opinion of the majority is rested
on the introductory clause as an interpreter of what is too plain to
admit of interpretation. What is the office of an introductory
clause when it is suffered to have an office. "Such introductory
words, says Chancellor Kent, 4 Com. 541, "are, like a preamble
to a statute, to be used only as a key to disclose the testator's
meaning." Then, before it can be used, the meaning must appear-to
be locked up. But treat them as a preamble to a statute and they
will produce the same result; for the preamble is never invoked
to expound the meaning of words too clear to adfait'of exposition.
"In doubtful cases," it is said, in Dwarris on Stat. 655, "recourse may be had to the preamble to discover the inducements
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the legislature had to the making of the statute; but when the
terms of the enacting clause are clear and positive, the preamble
cannot be resorted to. Let any lawyer say whether the legal effect
of any terms could be more clear and positive than the legal effect
of the words, "I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife
Elizabeth, eighty-five acres, and allowance of my land of my
dwelling-place whereon I now live." Why, then, bring down introductory words to the operative clause to obscure what is as clear
as a sun-beam to a professional eye without them ? Had the testator intended to make them words of devise he would have brought
them down himself. What if he would not ? His intention must
prevail; but he must express it in positive, not inferential, words,
to show what it actually was. Without such words, it may be a
subject of guess, but not of adjudication. Voluit aed non dixit
is the legal aphorism. Lord Mansfield was right in saying that
perhaps every devisor means to give a fee when he does not explicitly give less. Yet even he, with all his boasted liberality of
opinion and disregard of technicality, shrunk from the task of
giving effect to this putative intention, without definite and direct
words to declare it. It had been well if the courts had started
with the principle, since prescribed for prospective cases by Englisjh and American legislation; but to overturn their intermediate
adjudications would uproot titles and produce general consternation. It is for this reason that the English and American judges
have excluded extraneous influences and gone, in unambiguous
cases, by the direct words of the devise, without inferences, from
the introductory words. "It is established," as it is said in 2
Jarman on wills, 187, " that the word estate, occurring merely in
the introductory clause in the will, by which the testator professes
in the usual manner to dispose of all his worldly and temporal
estate, will not have the effect of enlarging the subsequent devises
in the will." The same principal is repeated in Powell on Devises
416; and there is not an exception to it in the English books, unless Grayson v. Atkinson, 1 Wilson, R. 833, be one. There were
several elements -in the constitution of that.case: the decisive ones
of blending the real and personal estate in the same disposition,
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and charging the land with debts and legacies. It is not clear on
what ground Lord Hardwicke put his opinion; and the case cannot
be deemed an authority for anything in particular.
It is assumed in the opinion of thc majority, that this unbroken
current of decisions elsewhere, has been -rolled back by a countercurrent of our own, insomuch as to bring down from the lumbergarret of the scriviner's cranium, the hacknied form of introductory
words, in order to stick it into the operative clause as a part of it,
and hitch it to any thing in the form and dimensions of an indefinite devise. It is not assumed that the words of it give a fee
proprio vigore; nor could it be, for, standing alone, they mean
nothing, or that the testator, having done with the usual legacy of
his soul, and with directions about his funeral and the payment of
his debts, was going to dispose of the residue of his property among
the objects of his bounty. Like the "grace of God" in a policy
of insurance, they arc words of course which serve as a prologue
to the business in hand, taken from the scrivener's formulary, and
put down preparatory to putting down the testator's devises and
legacies. Notwithstanding their stereotyped occurrence on every
will drawn by an unprofessional hand, it is insisted that wherever
there is any thing to hang them on, it takes their hue and becomes
a devise in fee. If that is not the effect attributed to them, in wliut
case can they have any other ? And if they are to have that effect
in any unambiguous case, they must have it in every case. Have
the decisions of this court produced a state of things so anomalous?
The first of them is Busby vs. Busby, 1 Dall. 226, which I
respectfully submit has been misapplied. The general principle is
pertenaciously maintained in every part of it. It was said the
words, "as to all my worldly estate in the beginning of a will, unconnected with any particular devise, show an intention to dispose
of the testator's whole estate, but will not carry an estate which
was clearly o dtted; but if it be dubious whether it has been omitted
or not, it will help the interprctation." With what devise in this
will are those words particularly connected? with the devise to the
widow, or with the de;ic- to the brother and sisters? or is it at all
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dubious that words to carry the fee are omitted in a devise of eightyfive acres?
Caldwell vs. Ferguson,2 Yeates 250, the next case invoked, was
a nisi prius decision; but it was well ruled. The word estate when
incorporated in the body of a devise, and not used to individuate
the subject of it, carries the testator's entire interest. "1Touching
such worldly estate wherewith it has pleased God to bless me,"
said the testator, "I give the same." What? His estate to'which
the effective words of the devise were immediately directed. The
word could not be brought down to the devise, for it was there
already. The whole was contained in one paragraph; and the
meaning of it was as clear as if the word "estate," had been put
in the place of the words " the same." We know not on what
ground the court put its opinion, for none is stated in the report;
but the devise was of woodland, which has always been held to
carry a fee.
Then came French vs. MclTheney, which certainly overcame us
like a summer cloud, but not without our special wonder. It had
been ruled at the circuit by Judge Yeates; but on what particular
ground we know not; and according to the course of the court,
then composed of three judges, the cause was heard on appeal by
Chief Justice Tilghman and Judge Brackenridge. The Chief
Justice took the ground I have occupied in this instance; but Judge
Brackenridge, whose notions about the propriety of rules to work
out the intention of a testator were peculiar, adopted the popular
meaning, independently of words of limitation or perpetuity; and
the judgment was affirmed.. Judge Duncan has told us in Cassell
vs. Cook, 8 Serg. & R. 288, that this opinion of the judge was
announced as a declaration of independence; and that Judge Yeates
disclaimed it, as he certainly did indirectly in Clayton vs. Clayton,
3 Binney 490. There is something plausible in the notion that
common sense is more likely to reach the actual intent, than artificial rules of construction. But wills are not always penned by men
of common sense. They frequently afford no clue to the testator's
meaning which common sense can lay hold on. The meaning might
seem clear to a man of good sense at the first blush; but, such is
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the imperfection of language, it might to a man of equally good
sense seem clear the other way. In such a case, what could be
done? Leave it to a jury to ascertain the intention? We know
how far plain sense goes to produce unanimity in a jury box. The
destination of the property would be left to chance or endless litigation. Besides, by reason of the happening of unforeseen and
unprovided for contingencies, it is sometimes an unavoidable duty
to suppose a testator to have had an intention where there actually
was none. Without a rule to conduct him to a conclusion, what
could a judge do? Rules of interpretation, though they do not
always effect the actual intent, produce certainty of result, stability
of title, ultimate repose, and prevent the value of the property,
thrice told, from being sunk in lawsuits; against which, a departure
from the popnlar meaning weighs not a feather. In Findlay vs.
Biddle, 3 Binney 161, that distinguished judge (for Judge Brackenridge, though failing in respect for precedent, was certainly distinguished for intellectual vigor in the investigation of legal principles)
resorted to a grammatical analysis of a devise-an unsafe expedient,
for every one knows how much the transposition or substitution of
a word may change the tone of the whole. Prencl vs. Mclhenny,
is an authority for, rather than against, what I take to be the
orthodox doctrine.
I In Campbell vs. Carson, 12 S. & R. 56, the introductory words
were legitimately resorted to in order to explain the ambiguous
words, "to be by her fully possessed and enjoyed"-a use of them
sanctioned by Busby v. Busby. In Johnson v. Morton, 10 Barr,
245, there were no introductory words at all; and in McClure v.
Douthitt, 3 Barr, 447, no more was decided than bad been decided
in Westminster Hall, that the word ' share' was sufficient of itself
to pass the testator's entire interest. True, it was said we ought
to have done at first what the legislature has done at last; but it
was not said that it was not too late to do it now at the expense of
those who have purchased titles supposed to have been long judicially settled.
So far the decisions of this court have been consistent, but adverse to the principle for which they have been cited. But in
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Miller v. Lynn, 7 Barr, 448, a devise ushered with the usual
flourish of trumpets was held to pass a fee without words of limitation or perpetuity, or any of their equivalents. That case was
a railroad accident. I agree that if it be law itrules the present;
but I have never known a more bold or reckless innovation. Evhen
the rule in Shelly's case was denied in it to be a rule of property
in Pennsylvania. Why a dissent was not marked in the report of
the case I know not; but I know that Mr. Justice Bell and myself
did not concur. The pressure of business left little time for consideration, and we were compelled to go at railroad speed, so that
much depended on the judge who prepared the opinion, which, unseen by the rest of the court before it was delivered, too often
exhibited his peculiar notions. The opinion of the learned judge
was a second declaration of independence. No authority was cited
for it, but the decision was rested on the effect of the introductory
words, though there was no ambiguity in the devising clause. Its
intrinsic evidence shows that the case was not deliberately considered.
Peppardv. Deal, 9 Barr, 149, is also cited; but though certain
dicta of the judge who delivered the opinion in that and the preceding case, would seem to favor the argument, the judgment,
which was alone the act of the court, does not. "As to my
worldly estate," said the testator, "I devise the house in which I
now live to my son Samuel; and the remainder of my estate, real
and personal, among my children." There were two features in
this devise, either of which gave the children a fee, but which were
not touched in the opinion--an immediate gift of the propertr as
the testator's estate, and a jumbling together of the real and personal estates. Harden vs.. Hayes, id. 151, is in the same category:
the land was charged with money, and expressly for that reason
the estate was enlarged to a fee.
Mc~ullough v. a-ilmer, 1 Harris, 320; Saylor vs. Kocher, 3
W. & S. 163; Harper vs. Blean, 3 Watts 471; Neide vs. Neide, 4
Rawle, 75, and Dice v. Shaeffer, 3 W. & S. 419, are cases in which
an intention to dispose of the fee was as clearly expressed and con-
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elusively disclosed as it could be, without technical words of limitation.
These are the cases adduced to show that this court had shaken off
the rule in England and our sister States; and it must be left to
future judges to say whether it has done so. The importance of the
doctrine of stare decisis in cases which involve title to land, I leave
to the consideration of the profession, and emphatically of the owners of real estate. I am therefore of opinion that the construction
made of this will when it was here before ought not to be disturbed.
BLACK, 0. J., also filed a dissenting opinion.
NoTE.-At the present session of this court at Philadelphia, the same point arose
in a Pittsburg case, and an opinion affirming that of Lowrie, J., was delivered
by
WooDwARD, J.-The only question in this case arises upon the construction of
the will of Judah Calt, deceased. After the usual introductory clause the testator
says, "as to such worldly estate wherewith it has pleased God to intrust me, I dispose of the same as follows ;" Imnyrinis relates to debts and funeral expenses;
"Second, I will and devise that all my landed estate which I own in the County of
Eric, as well as in other parts of the State of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, be disposed of as hereinafter described." He then goes on to make various devises to
his niece, Eliza B. Ely, and, among others, the two lots in question, known as 367
and 368. In these devises to her there are no words of inheritance, condition or
limidtion, and no devise over of any of the property given to her. Is her estate under
this will a life-estate or a fee simple? Carrying down the clauses of the will which
I have quoted and connecting them with the devise to Eliza, it is apparent that he
meant to give her his whole estate in these lots, and this conviction is riveted by
the absence of any devise over. But may those clauses be thus brought down and
connected? That they may has been so fully demonstrated lately in this court by
my Brother Lowrie, in the case of 91,rher vs. .Afqer, that it would be a waste of
time to do more than refer to that able opinion and the numerous authorities therein
cited and discussed.
I take this opportunity to say, in regard to Shriver vs. eyer, that finding on record (See 4 Harris's State Rep. 504) an opinion from a judge who is entitled to my
profoundest deference, that the will there created only a life-estate, I paused long
before I consented to Judge Lowrie's opinion that it created a fee. But I was constrained at last by the force not only of authority, but of reason to concur with
him and our Bro. Lewis in overruling the former opinion of this court, and in declaring the estate devised a fee simple and not a life-estate. Subsequent reflection
has confirmed me in the opinion finally settled in that case, an opinion abundantly
sustained by the most approved authorities, and in accordance with the spirit of our
legislature in the Act of 8th April, 1833, relating to last wills and testaments (see. 9.
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-DistrictCourt of Philadelphia,December, 1852.
NORTH A3EIRICANI XSURANCE

COM1'ANY vs. LEVY.

1. When the plaintiff, as insurer, by several counts claims damages for expenses
alleged to have been incurred in the investigation of representations falsely and
fraudulently made to him by the defendant, for the purpose of procuring a policy
upon the life of his debtor, and no evidence is given to support these counts, but
evidence that certain representations made by defendant at the time was produced, a count in trover joined with them is not sustained.

2. Whether, if such a policy were fraudulently procured. trorvrwould lie for it.3. It seems, if there be any common law remedy, dctnd,.* is the proper one; but re-

dress might be sought in a Court of Chancery upon an application for a surrender
of the policy for cancellation.

This action was brought to recover a policy of insurance alleged
to have been fraudulently obtained from plaintiffs, as also damages
for so obtaining the same and refusing to redeliver it.
The defendant insured the life of Jno. B. Sturdevant, representing him in good health and of a certain age, and producing a ccrtificate of his health, said to be given by his family physician.
Plaintiff offered various witnesses to prove that the representations made were false -- that defendant had falsely stated the
amount of indebtedness of said Jno. B. Sturdevant to him, which
was part of his declaration at the time the policy was procured; that
said Sturdevant was not in good health; that his age was greater
than alleged, and that the physician giving the signature was not
his family physician.
After hearing the testimony, the judge ordered a non-suit.
This was a motion to take off non-suit.
Chas. E. Lex & i. M. PhilliTps, Esq'rs, for Plaintiffs.
C. At. Husbands Win. L. Hirst, Esq'rs, for Defendant.
On the authority of Stirbee" vs. Mryet, therefore, the majority of the court decide
in the case before us that Eliza B. Ely tok a fee simple estate in the lots in question under the -will of Mr. Calt, and the judgment of the Common Pleas is accordingly affirmed.-

Wood vs. JHilt.
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December 18, 1852, the opinion of the Court was delivered by
STROUD, J.-The defendant, as a creditor of John B. Sturdevant, obtained from the plaintiffs an insurance on the life of Sturdevant. In less than a year from the date of the policy, and within the time to which the insurance extended, and whilst Sturdevant
was living, the plaintiffs say they discovered that several representations which the defendant had made to them in respect to the
age, the state of health of Sturdevant, and the amount of the debt
due by him to the defendant, had been falsely and fraudulently
made. On this alleged discovery they tendered to the defendant
the money which he had paid as a premium for the insurance, and
at the same time gave him notice that they regarded the policy as
void in consequence of the false and fraudulent representations
which they asserted he had made.
They soon afterwards instituted this action. The declaration
filed is in covenant, and contains numerous counts.
Thefirsd of these is in trover for the policy of insurance. The
other counts, although varying in some particulars of statement, may
be classed together as demanding a reimbursement of expenses
alleged to have been incurred by the company in the investigation
of the representations made by the defendant falsely and fraudulently, in order to procure the policy.
No evidence whatever was given to sustain any of the last-mentioned counts, and they may at once be dismissed from inquiry.
After receiving all the evidence offered by the plaintiff, a nonIuit was ordered under the 7th section of the Act of 11th March,
1836, relative to this Court.
A motion has been made to set aside this non-suit.
This Iuotion raises but one question: whether the evidence given
sustains the count in trover for the policy.
N6 precedent for such an action has been found. It is sought to
be maintained on the ground that as under similar circumstances
a Court of Equity would compel the surrender of the policy for
cancellation, a, court of common law ought to reach the same end
by the common law remedy which has been resorted to.
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The novelty of the attempt, the want of precedent for a similar
use of the action, does not, it is true, in itself, constitute an insurmountable objection to the plaintiff. But it certainly furnishes a
very strong presumption against it. With equal reason, trover
might be brought by an obligok of a bond, or a maker of a promissory note, whenever fraud in the procuring of these instruments
would be an available defence to the usual common law actions of
debt or assurnpsit. But such a procedure would be an unheard of
novelty.
It is said, the person whose life has been insured by his creditor,
may be the most important witness to show the state of his health,
at the time when the insurance was effected. And consequently,
to wait until an action has been brought upon the policy, by reason
of his death, would operate to the detriment of the insurer, in the
loss of this evidence. But disease, so latent as to elude the detection of a physician, could scarcely be known to a creditor of any
one, whose life might be the' subject of insurance, and unless the
representation supposed to be false were knowingly or rashly made,
it would not, speaking generally, vitiate the policy.
Whether, admitting the policy to be incapable of enforcement,
by reason of its fraudulent procurement, the insurer is entitled to
its possession, may be very questionable. By the commercial law,
payment cannot be demanded of a bill of exchange or promissory
note, without a contemporaneous surrender of the instrument.
.Howard v. Bobinson, 7 B. & C., 90, but this is grounded on the
custom of merchants, and is peculiar and restricted to negotiable
evidences of debt. The rule of the law as to other documents,generally, if not universally, is otherwise, and in defect of this
element, it is not easy to perceive how the action of trover could
have any basis.
If any common law remedy can be supported on the state of
facts existing in the evidence of this case, detinue would seem to
be the proper one.
But there is no necessity in any view, which can be taken of the
subject, to sustain.either trover or detinue.

